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Abstract: Online privacy policies are important mechanisms for informing web site users about the level of 
information privacy protection afforded them when visiting web sites. To date, societal mechanisms and 
technologies have been the focus of attempts to improve the quality and effectiveness of online privacy policies. 
Little attention, however, has been given to the development and use of organisational measures for this purpose. 
In this paper we present findings from a longitudinal, empirical study of online privacy policies. Our research 
found that although online privacy policies have improved in quality and effectiveness since 2000, they still fall 
well short of the level of privacy assurance desired by consumers. This study has identified broad areas of 
deficiency in existing online privacy policies, and offers a solution in the form of an holistic framework for the 
development, factors and content of online privacy policies for organisations. Our study adds to existing theory 
in this area and, more immediately, will assist businesses concerned about the effect of privacy issues on 
consumer web usage. 
 
1. Introduction 
Information privacy is the legitimate collection, use and disclosure of personal information, or “the interest an 
individual has in controlling, or at least significantly influencing, the handling of data about themselves” (Clarke, 
1999). In our times, online privacy concerns continue to flourish within an atmosphere of general distrust of 
institutions and fears of technology abuse (Agre and Rotenberg, 1997). The main issues are intrusions, 
manipulation and discrimination; third party capture of personally identifiable information (PII); and identity 
theft and stalking (Westin, 2001). Online privacy, as a significant factor in consumer trust, is an imperative for e -
business success (Harris Interactive, 2002; Hoffman et al, 1999). However, its provision is at odds with 
organisational goals such as the maximisation of personal information resource value obtained from disclosure to 
third parties (often for commercial gain), and retaining of customer loyalty via enhanced personalised service. 
Compounding this problem, user online privacy needs are frequently inconsistent with important societal values 
such as freedom of information, or public health and safety (Etzioni, 1999). In attempting to resolve these 
conflicting perspectives, considerable effort has been expended in seeking societal, national, organisational and 
technical solutions which can provide a balance of online privacy regarded as fair—from individual, societal, 
national and organisational perspectives.  
The online privacy policy (OPP) (or privacy statement) is a key organisational measure for assuring online 
privacy for web site users (Chung and Paynter, 2002; Lichtenstein, 2001; OPA, 2002). These policies articulate 
the collection, use and protection of user personal information, as well as the choices offered to users in 
exercising their rights in respect of the control of their own personal information. The policies are intended to 
represent fair information privacy practices, as first defined by the OECD (1980), and later modified and 
extended by individual countries in order to accommodate perceived e-business and globalisation demands (for 
example, NPP, 2000; FTC, 2000).  
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To date, OPPs have a poor record in providing online protection. Studies conducted in the past few years 
showed that significant proportions of American and Australian OPPs failed to comply with recognized fair 
information practice principles—and overall, were ineffective (Anton and Earp, 2001; Babu, 2000; Culnan, 
1999; enonymous, 2000; EPIC, 1999; Fox et al, 2000; FTC, 2000; Freehill Hollingdale & Page, 2000; Harris 
Interactive, 2002). These studies found that OPPs, terms of service, conditions of use, and other online policies 
with information privacy ramifications, were frequently overlooked by users in their eagerness to gain access to 
online products and services. Typically, users either signalled consent to policy conditions without reading the 
policies, or declined them unread. Policies were frequently unclear—for example, they were ambiguous, couched 
in “legalese”, misleading or deceptive. Disturbingly, OPPs were found to be inconsistent with actual business 
privacy practices, as well as being poorly linked to business strategy and operations in general.  
A recent report indicating some improvement in the quality of US OPPs (PFF, 2002) is interesting in light of 
the much-debated lack of privacy legislation in the US, where much has been expected from industry self-
regulation, coupled with increased levels of public awareness, to bring about the changes desired. Australian 
OPPs have also improved in quality to some extent, according to an evaluation performed in February, 2001—a 
date well in advance of the recently enacted privacy legislation compliance deadline of December that year 
(Anderson, 2001). Nevertheless, in tandem with these positive indicators, well-publicized privacy violations 
continue to fuel public anxiety over privacy issues, with blame often ascribed in no small measure to ineffective 
OPPs (CNET, 2002; Mainelli, 2002).  
In order to promote the effectiveness of OPPs and consumer confidence in them, a range of societal and 
technological measures are available. Privacy policy enforcement via co-regulation (for example, Australia) or 
self-regulation (for example, the US) are alternative approaches although, in the US, some type of legislation 
now appears inevitable (EPIC, 2002; FTC, 2000; Hollings, 2002). In a recent poll, consumers identified “third 
party verification that a company’s privacy practices match its OPP” as the single most important step a 
company could take toward securing consumer trust (Harris Interactive, 2002). Existing mechanisms for this 
purpose include privacy certification and seals such as TRUSTe and APCC (2001), as well as independent 
audits. P3P technology allows users to view a translated version of an OPP in a more usable form (W3C, 2002) 
and matches user privacy preferences with site privacy. However, critics of this approach point to the limitations 
of any technological translation of OPP and their matching with user online privacy needs—and observe that to 
date, few companies have adopted this approach (Harvey and Sanzaro, 2002). 
Rather than relying upon societal and technological support for OPPs, organisations can provide more 
effective policies by employing appropriate guidelines in their development. Although various sets of guidelines 
already exist, we believe there are very good reasons for developing new, improved guidelines. Existing 
guidelines (for example, FTP, 2000; NPP, 2000; OPA, 2002) were not developed from empirical evidence, but 
were instead based on professional expertise, and may therefore have missed some of the issues, in this 
peculiarly dynamic and complex area. Some progress has been made toward developing empirically grounded, 
organisational guidelines. For example, Anton and Earl (2001) studied a set of health privacy policies using a 
goal search approach and identified a taxonomy of OPPs, although this did not account for contextual issues 
such as organisational and societal factors, and usability. Babu (2000) reported that existing sets of guidelines 
possessed some, but not all, of the desired characteristics. Finally, recent evidence suggests that existing OPPs 
are ineffective in managing the relevant risks (Sullivan, 2002), possibly due to deficiencies in current sets of 
guidelines.  
In a companion paper, we presented the results of one part of a broad research project investigating online 
privacy policies—a complete, comprehensive set of organisational guidelines for OPPs, which businesses can 
utilize to develop their own OPPs (Lichtenstein et al., 2002).  In this paper, we present the results and findings 
from a different part of the same research project. Here, our aim is to identify the commonly found deficiencies 
in existing OPPs, and recommend ways in which businesses can overcome them. Guidelines for OPPs can be 
useful not only for developing OPPs, but also for identifying their weaknesses—by acting as an instrument for 
measuring policy quality in specific areas, as well as for enabling the identification of trends and patterns which 
suggest the larger, often holistic problems—which in turn, demand holistic solutions. We employ our set of 
guidelines to these ends in this paper. 
Following this brief survey of the literature and current research into online privacy protection, we 
summarise our research design. Next, we recap and summarise our guidelines for effective online privacy 
policy—based on the findings of Babu (2000), which we have extended via additional empirical investigations. 
We then discuss deficiencies in existing OPPs. As the culmination of our research study, we present an holistic 
framework for online privacy policies. Finally, we summarise and draw conclusions. 
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2. Research design 
This longtitudinal study was conducted in two stages, two years apart. In 2000, a literature review yielded a 
first-cut conceptual model of guidelines for OPP (Babu, 2000), for the purpose of exploring the topic further. A 
critical analysis of ten OPPs residing on the web sites of eight American businesses and two Australian 
businesses, was performed. These sites were chosen because they were dynamic, recognized e-business sites at 
the time of study, and because they featured substantial OPPs. The OPPs were evaluated for compliance with the 
first-cut guidelines in order to identify deficiencies for which solutions could be sought, and as a strategy for 
identifying unexpected, novel and useful elements within existing OPPs which could then be incorporated in 
future revisions of guidelines. Guideline compliance was measured by the presence of a reasonable 
implementation of it within a policy.  
The policies were then analysed contextually, by studying the influence of HCI, organisational and human 
factors, and other issues, on the quality of the policies. A cross-policy analysis elicited trends, patterns and 
differences. To capture the relationship between an OPP and its organisational context, Babu conducted an in-
depth case study of a recognized Australian online retailer—termed OzESale—via semi-structured interviews 
and document collection. As a result of these empirical investigations, Babu produced a revised, improved set of 
guidelines for OPP (Babu, 2000).  
In the second stage of this project—our extension in 2002 of the original investigations—we reviewed recent 
literature, as well as the original research data and results, including the guidelines. We then analysed the nine 
still existing OPPs in their updated forms in April, 2002, for guideline compliance and contextual issues— again 
identifying trends, patterns and differences. We arrived at a set of guidelines for effective OPPs and identified 
major areas of deficiencies in current OPPs, leading us to a solution in the form of an holistic framework for 
online privacy policies for organisations. 
3. Organisational guidelines for online privacy policy 
In this section we summarise a comprehensive set of high level guidelines for online privacy policies, using 
the following categories: awareness, data quality, security, information movement, user identification, 
accountability, user access, assurance, contact, choice, change management, children’s privacy, sensitive 
information and exceptions (compiled from Babu, 2000; Anton and Earp, 2001; NPP, 2000; FTC, 2000; and our 
own empirical studies). Note that not all guidelines included in our categorization are addressed by various 
national regulations, although our study suggests that all our guidelines are important, and therefore worthy of 
inclusion in our final set. Our set of guidelines is intended as a map for businesses, to ensure that all important 
areas are addressed in the development of OPPs. The guidelines can also be utilized as a means for evaluating 
OPPs and identifying weaknesses which need addressing—a use for which we employ them in the next section. 
By way of introduction, we provide a brief summary in this section of the overall results of a longtitudinal 
comparison of OPPs in the two different years (full details of the comparison are found in Lichtenstein et al., 
2002).  In general, we found that the OPPs studied in 2000 had improved in quality over the period to 2002. We 
attribute this positive trend primarily to an increased consciousness of online privacy issues within the e-business 
community, combined with the effects of privacy legislation or industry self-regulation, based on recognized, fair 
information practices. Despite our finding of overall improvement in quality since 2000, we nevertheless found 
various deficiencies, in that many guidelines were inadequately addressed or missing, in the OPPs studied in 
2002.  In the following section, we discuss the main areas of deficiency arising from our investigations. 
4. Deficiencies in online privacy policies 
We have identified the following issues as the major deficiencies in current online privacy policies. We 
generalise in this discussion only in order to highlight the problems. We wish to point out that not all policies 
studied exhibited all the weaknesses described below—but, rather, that those deficiencies presented here are the 
main types found across the policies, overall. 
· User awareness  
Although companies have clearly made inroads into providing useful features and information in OPPs to 
assist users in becoming more aware of the privacy issues arising from site visits, there is still substantial room 
for improvement. The most fundamental type of awareness to provide is that of the importance and meaning of 
the OPP itself. Many people do not know what an online privacy policy (or privacy statement) is, nor realize its 
significance, and may overlook it for these reasons. Sites currently provide little awareness of the importance of 
this policy, nor do they direct users to it. “Terms of agreement” are often highlighted at the commencement of a 
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site visit, although the OPP is rarely drawn to the user’s attention.  At the next level, most sites provide a basic 
awareness of the policy’s existence and how to locate it, via conspicuous links to the OPPs on each page, in a 
consistent position. However, on occasions when privacy threats are more likely to occur—either with or without 
the user’s awareness of the imminence of the threat (for example, on those occasions when personal information 
is being requested of the user)—few sites provide prominent links to their OPPs (for example, in a position 
adjacent to data collection boxes).  
The quality of the language expression provided by OPPs needs far more attention. Currently, the English is 
too complex, and replete with “legalese”, ambiguity, inconsistencies, confusion and use of the words “most”, 
“many”, “some” etc—all of which can be used to hide exceptions which are not subject to the same rules. Many 
users do not understand the particular meaning of privacy terms used, for example, “disclosure”. The net effect is 
to hide the facts from the users, rather than making them aware of how their personal privacy is really being 
handled.  
Current OPPs do not fully inform users about personal information collected. Policies do not provide 
complete lists of personal information that may be collected during site visits (nor, indeed, at later stages, via 
tracking through cookies, or code secretly stored on user computers)—hiding behind conditional clauses such as 
“Depending on what you purchase, we may also need to collect other personal information, like your clothing 
size..”. Policies do not fully inform users of the purpose of such collection, using general clauses such as “We 
use that information to service your account and to personalize your experience at ...”. Finally, policies do not 
articulate the different third parties to whom personal information is disclosed, nor the purposes and uses of 
information so disclosed by those third parties, once they have the information in their possession. Confounding 
the user about disclosure practices is common.  In one OPP we found, “We'll never share that information with 
third parties interested in e-mailing you”. This, of course, did not preclude collected personal information from 
being shared with third parties with interests other than e-mailing the user—for example, placing pop-up 
advertisements on the user’s computer. Sites provided little in the way of informing users about the level of 
protection afforded at third party sites linked to by the site, as well as at other third parties with whom personal 
information could be shared at some future time. We address third party involvement as an important issue in its 
own right, later in this section.  
 Consumer education for the purpose of increasing user awareness of online privacy issues is currently very 
limited indeed, and we discuss this important issue separately also, later in this section 
· Usability issues  
OPPs pay scant attention to usability issues, which are always important in user interfaces, and particularly so 
in privacy interfaces (Babu, 2000; Greenberg, 1999; Lau et al, 1999). Usability has been identified as an 
important factor in all types of online policies for the securing of consumer trust (Egger, 2001; Nielsen Norman 
Group, 2001). However, OPPs are notoriously ambiguous, difficult to read, full of “legalese”, poorly structured, 
and generally difficult to understand. Overall, the policies are hindered by poorly designed HCIs—some more so 
than others. 
· Threats, risks and vulnerabilities  
OPPs typically neglect to articulate online privacy threats, provide a risk assessment for these, or provide 
information about the vulnerabilities of the users’ personal information to privacy threats, although such 
information would clearly be of great interest to users. We did, however, find several exceptions to this rule. 
Notably, eBay features a vulnerabilities scenario analysis which provides useful information in this respect.   
· User roles and responsibilities  
Very little information about user roles and responsibilities is provided in policies. Some improvements in 
this area have taken place in the two years since the earlier study, indicating that companies are now more aware 
of this important aspect of OPPs. In some policies, users are advised to safeguard their passwords, and to sign off 
and close browsers at the end of accessing the sites. In most cases, significant user roles and responsibilities 
(with respect to managing their online privacy) are not stated in the OPP but instead are found in other online 
policies, such as “terms of use”.  Finally, we believe it would be very difficult for users to identify their 
responsibilities with respect to managing their online privacy in current OPPs, as the various specified user 
responsibilities are spread throughout the policies, in piecemeal fashion. 
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· Control and choice 
Users are not in control of their personal information. Rather, the companies exercise almost all control, a 
situation which is unlikely to engender user confidence. In particular, users lack sufficient, consistent consent 
opportunities, with respect to the provision, disclosure or use of their personal information. Most policies offer 
complex combinations of opt-out and opt-in within their OPPs, which can be confusing.  Furthermore, consent is 
sometimes offered covertly, for example, “By using ... and providing us with your personal information, you are 
accepting the privacy practices described in this policy statement”.   
· Data quality  
Although users are usually offered some type of access to OPPs for the purpose of checking and correcting 
their personal information, in many cases the user is only provided with a contact email address, rather than an 
online form to update immediately. Furthermore, all responsibility for data quality assurance “appears” to be 
with the user, with none overtly guaranteed by the company (in the OPP), other than assurances relating to 
security threats.  
· Links to privacy practices  
The only overt linkage between the OPP and actual business privacy practices is the presence on the site of a 
privacy seal, which many companies do not possess. In our case study of OzeSale in 2000, there appeared to be 
very little connection between policy and practices—a clear cause for concern. Normally, company policies are 
translated into procedures which are documented and then followed, thereby facilitating not only correct 
implementation of the policies, but also future audits and reviews. It was not clear from the policies that this 
translation to procedures was occurring and indeed, at OzESale, it was not. We also observed, through our study 
of OzESale, some indication as to why organisations may not be following their online privacy policies in 
practice (many such policy violations have been widely reported). It appears that privacy infrastructures within 
companies are not yet powerful enough, or sufficiently developed to enforce their privacy policies inside the 
companies themselves, although this may be changing with the recent trend toward establishing organisational 
Privacy Officer functions and privacy certification via annual audits.   
· Consumer education  
There is a lack of understanding of the issues provided by policies, for consumers. For example, consumers 
cannot find answers from existing OPPs to the following questions: “What are online privacy policies?” “What 
will happen if I ignore them?” “Are privacy statements and terms of use the same things?” “What does 
personally identifiable information mean?” “What is a third party disclosure?” “Can someone find me from my 
personally identifiable information?” —and so much more. 
· Flow of personal information  
Cookies used for monitoring/tracking purposes are given only cursory explanations in policies—not 
extensively or clearly enough for the average user. Sites often make some commitment to explain their use of 
cookies as a form of monitoring or tracking for the purpose of better serving the user, although the user isn’t 
given a genuine choice much of the time to refuse cookies—because, without them, many site features simply 
will not be provided. We feel this is an unethical business practice, as the user will be all too often easily swayed 
into accepting the cookies in order to obtain the desired services. 
 
Information about personal information aggregation, storage, transfer, disposal and personalisation is scanty, 
missing or exhibits other problems, as follows. There are inconsistencies—for example, one policy stated in one 
section that anonymous (ie non PII, such as IP address) information would not be linked to the user’s PII without 
their consent (ie there was choice), while in another section, the policy stated that it would in future be 
considering giving the user a choice as to whether the anonymous information collected could be linked to PII, 
as currently the information could be linked (ie there was no user choice). There are omissions—for example, 
regarding information storage, only data quality or security issues were addressed in policies, and the duration of 
storage was not made explicit in most cases, in either year. There was cause for concern, for example, 
“Information collected at this site may be disclosed to third parties where functions are being outsourced”. There 
were generalities and vagueness, for example, “information collected is used to provide the customer with better 
service”.   
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Online Privacy Policy
Guideline Category 
Brief Description of Guideline  Guideline Within Category 
 
 1. Awareness The site should facilitate user  
awareness of its privacy policies. 
1.1 Prominence/openness 
1.2 Language 
1.3 Notification 
1.4 Classification 
1.5 Collection 
1.6 Purpose/use 
1.7 Disclosure 
1.8 Consumer education 
1.9 Third party involvement 
2. Data quality Personal information should be 
maintained as complete, timely and 
correct, by the company. 
 
3. Security Personal information should be 
secured wherever possible. 
3.1 Data security 
3.2 Data transmission 
3.3 Cookies 
4. Information  
movement 
Details of personal privacy  
provided in various states of 
information movement should 
 be provided to the user. 
4.1 Information monitoring 
4.2 Information aggregation 
4.3 Information storage 
4.4 Information transfer 
4.5 Information disposal 
4.6 Information personalisation 
4.7 Transborder data flow 
5. User identification Use and disclosure of a user’s 
site identifier as either PII, 
anonymous, pseudonymous, should 
be stated. 
5.1 User identifier 
5.2 Anonymity 
5.3 Pseudonymity 
5.4 Nonrepudiation 
6. Accountability Company and user should be 
held accountable for actions. 
6.1 Enforcement 
6.2 User responsibilities 
7. User access Users should have opportunity to 
participate in their personal 
information protection as necessary.
7.1 User access and self-correction 
7.2 User access to other user data 
8. Assurance Policies should state ways in which 
companies assure users they are 
following their OPPs in practice. 
8.1 User recourse 
8.2 Verification 
8.3 Consequences 
9. Contact Policies should state how, and for 
what purpose, organisations contact 
users using PII to make the contact. 
 
10. Choice The user should be given choices 
with respect to collection and use 
of personal information. 
10.1 Consent 
11. Change  
management 
Companies require procedures for 
change management of their OPPs. 
11.1 Evolution 
11.2 Changes to policy 
11.3 Change of company control 
12. Children’s Privacy The policy should provide 
information regarding access by,  
and involvement of, children. 
 
13. Sensitive  
information 
The ways in which sensitive  
information (eg religion) is treated 
differently to other personal 
information, should be explained. 
 
14. Exceptions Exceptions to the OPP policy  
should be clearly stated. 
 
Table 1.  Summary of guidelines for online privacy policy (Lichtenstein et al., 2002) (compiled from Babu, 
2000; Anton and Earp, 2001; NPP, 2000; FTC, 2000 and our empirical studies) 
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Transborder personal information flow is often not addressed by policies at all, so that users would not be 
aware of what level of protection would be provided should their personal information move across a state or 
national border into another legal jurisdiction. 
· Change management 
Users are unable to consult their OPP history with respect to a particular site. We did not find even one OPP 
which provided this facility in our study—a deficiency bound to engender user anxiety eventually, especially 
once related incidents are published in the popular media with greater frequency.  In a recent case involving 
Hotmail, many users were startled to discover they had unwittingly given their permissions—through earlier 
incarnations of Hotmail’s OPP—for their personal information to be disclosed to third parties (Mainelli, 2002). 
Yet some of these users were convinced they had never given such permissions.  
· Relationship to other company policies  
There is a great deal of confusion for a user who is attempting to ascertain the relationship between the OPP 
and other online and offline company policies. There are no answers in OPPs or in other areas of sites, to 
questions such as: “What is the relationship between an organisation’s (offline) privacy policy and its OPP?” and 
“What is the relationship between the OPP and other online policies such as: terms of use, legal policy and 
security policy?”  At present, businesses appear to be dumping their OPPs online merely by mirroring their 
existing offline forms, chunked into slightly smaller screen packets accessible via links from an initial list of 
topic headings—or worse, presented as a lengthy online document, which the user has to scroll down 
(tiresomely) to read in its entirety. Offline company policies were not designed to be human computer interfaces. 
We also note here that a policy noticeably absent from all sites studied was an online Code of Ethics, which a 
site user may find useful to consult, and which could increase user trust in the company visited.  
· Data transmission vulnerabilities 
Users are not made aware of the specific nature of threats to their data during transmission, such as 
interception, eavesdropping and masquerading. Most policies issued a disclaimer to the effect that security across 
the Internet is never, and could never be, 100% secure.  
· Third party privacy protection 
Although most sites summarise privacy protection information about third party sites linked to, as well as 
about third parties to whom information could be disclosed by the company through private negotiations (ie third 
parties not hyperlinked to the site)—the information provided is often just a disclaimer, rather than any kind of 
assurance.  
· User identification  
User identification issues about the use and disclosure of a user’s site identifier as either PII, anonymous, or 
pseudonymous, are rarely addressed—and where they are addressed, are poorly explained. With respect to 
accountability, the only mechanisms for user enforcement of policy provided by most OPPs in both years was an 
email contact address, and/or the presence of privacy seals such as TRUSTe.  
·  User recourse 
Policies provide little information about the types of grievances consumers may have, and when it would be 
appropriate to contact the company regarding these. The methods of contact provided are not always convenient 
for the user. For example, a policy listing a US phone number when the user is located in Australia, is clearly 
inconvenient and inappropriate from the user perspective. 
5.  An holistic approach to online privacy policy  
We observed throughout our study, as well as in our analysis of deficiencies in the previous section, the 
interplay of many different types of factors in the topic area of OPP.  In recent years, there has been a growing 
recognition of the need for holistic security and system solutions which integrate the human, social, 
organisational and technical issues (Baskerville et al, 2000; Lichtenstein, 2001; Lichtenstein and Swatman, 
2001). On reviewing the many diverse issues raised in the guidelines as well as in the analysis of deficiencies in 
the previous section, we propose an holistic framework for online privacy policy (Figure 1) comprising three sets 
of guidelines—a set of factors to be considered when developing the policy, a method for the development of the 
policy, and a set of guidelines for the content of the policy (Table 1).  Our framework is an adaptation of the 
framework for Internet security policy developed by Lichtenstein (2001).  
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The original framework for Internet security policy included the online privacy policy as a sub-policy of the 
Internet security policy, suggesting that the framework may well be adaptable for use with online privacy 
policies. Currently, we have not developed models for the components shown in Figure 1—except for the 
Content model, which is represented by our set of guidelines (Table 1). 
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Figure 1. Framework for Online Privacy Policy  
Clearly, a model which articulates the online privacy risks to be considered when developing the policy, 
would be useful—while models for the different types of factors in the factors model (organisational, 
administrative, legal, societal, technical, standards and human issues) would also play a helpful role in enabling 
businesses to identify all the important issues that need to be taken into account in OPP development. Figure 1 
shows the development of the OPP by performing a risk assessment of the identified online privacy risks as they 
impact the business privacy data, in order to identify the high risk online privacy threats to be addressed in the 
policy.  Other factors are also taken into account, as are the content model (our guidelines in Table 1) and 
existing company policies (“org policies” and “Internet security policy (ISP)” in the diagram) —in order to 
develop the OPP. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we have reviewed the issues in online protection via online privacy policies, and summarised a 
set of high level organisational guidelines for companies to utilize in the development of an OPP. We provided a 
descriptive analysis of the deficiencies observed in Australian and US OPPs in 2000 and 2002, which companies 
can use to improve their future policies. As the culmination of this stage of our research project, we proposed an 
holistic framework for online privacy policy—which incorporates our guidelines, and includes a risk-based 
method for developing the policy, as well as a model of the types of factors to be considered in policy 
development. We suggest that this framework would prove useful to businesses in its current form, but far more 
so when developed to a greater depth. Currently, it is a very preliminary piece of research, requiring further 
exploration and refinement.  
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Although our results were limited to a longitudinal study of nine policies over two years and a single case 
study—and of course we cannot generalise from this small sample of data—our results indicate there has been a 
significant improvement in the quality of OPPs over the period 2000-2002, which we attribute to increased 
public awareness of the issues, combined with co-regulation (Australia) or industry self-regulation (US). 
Nevertheless, there is still a significant shortfall between policies, and the requirements for such policies as 
indicated by our guidelines. Businesses need to set as a priority the improvement of their online privacy policies 
for a multitude of reasons—including raising ethical business standards online, “doing the right thing” by their 
online customers, and securing the elusive consumer trust component that can provide e-business success. 
Privacy is an area of considerable concern to many online consumers (Harris Interactive, 2002), and those 
companies which provide adequate support for their customers’ privacy – and particularly those which present 
this information in an effective manner – increase the likelihood of consumer loyalty.  As safety is the crucial 
issue today for airlines, so may privacy become for online businesses in the next decade.  
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